Red Teaming and Pen Testing for Neoclouds

Anyone with a credit card can become a tenant inside your data center. Lava red-teams your GPU cloud itself, from a tenant’s seat and from inside your architecture, and shows you what’s breachable before anyone else finds it.

Your pen test covers the software, not the machine

BMCs, GPU fabrics, firmware and tenant isolation are usually left out of scope. When SemiAnalysis tested 25 GPU clouds, tenants reached other tenants. Lava tests every layer, from one tenant node to your control plane.

Attack from a tenant’s seat

From one tenant node, we attack everything around it: network, storage, GPU fabric, BMC, orchestration, control plane and management network. We hunt down exposed secrets and the last tenant’s leftovers. Your isolation is tested, not assumed.

Management PlaneHandover ResidueHost & ContainerTenant ATenant BFabric PartitioningCriticalShared ServicesNetwork Segmentation

Go below the software

Test the layers a standard pen test skips: BMCs and out-of-band networks, InfiniBand keys and RoCE trust, firmware and Secure Boot.

No password-strength rules enforced for local accountsHostBoot chain is not cryptographically verified (Secure Boot off)12assetsMediumBMCCipher suite 0 enabled412assetsCriticalNetworkManagement interface reachable from the internet6assetsCriticalHostPrior tenant data may survive on the local scratch RAID24assetsHighBMCIPMI over LAN enabled412assetsHigh

Penetrate the control plane

Test your architecture, segmentation and trust boundaries, and the Kubernetes, Slurm, provisioning and platform APIs that run your cloud.

Attack pathsWhere an attacker is standing, and what the chain reaches from thereLast analysis · 9m agoInternet2 pathsTenant User2 pathsFirewall exposure chains BMC compromise to Weka theft6 stages · 412 BMCs · 2 Weka clustersCriticalStolen instance credentials reach the control plane5 stages · 1 secret · 74 infra hostsCriticalStorage exfiltration via an over-privileged account4 stages · 2 Weka clusters · no audit trailHighManagement fabric takeover via exposed SSH5 stages · 96 switches · 2 fabricsHigh

Chain findings into attack paths

Single findings are joined into the paths an attacker would actually take across layers, ranked by what is breachable.

What to fix first1,284 findings, ranked by what each fix actually closesLast scan · 12m agoClose Redfish to the tenant VLAN on 412 BMCsCloses 2 pathsRotate the shared root credential across 47 BMCsCloses 1 pathEnforce partitioning on 2 InfiniBand fabricsCloses 1 pathPatch CVE-2024-38482 on 11 BMCsNo path todayRanked by what each fix closes, not by how many alerts it clears.

Prove your cloud is secure

Get an executive summary, every finding with an owner on your team, and a retest of each fix: evidence you can show customers and auditors. Then keep testing your cloud continuously on the Lava platform.

Tenant security reportWhat you hand a customer who asks how you keep them apartQ3 202694/100Tenant isolation verified across compute, network and storageNodes attested clean before handover, and after releaseNo cross-tenant path found in this periodShare with customerEvidence attachedRegenerated every month

From our research

Find your gaps before your customers do